Responsive regulation and industrial pollution in India

It is well known that strict enforcement of environmental regulations is needed to achieve their intended objectives. India is no different. Although the Pollution Control Boards (PCBs) have been equipped with institutions that control industrial pollution, enforcement has been sub-optimal. Hyderabad, with 450 large and medium-scale pharmaceutical firms, has witnessed massive industrial pollution despite the presence of regulatory institutions for pollution control. In this thesis, I examine the role of a crucial change in the enforcement governance of Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board (APPCB) – citizen participation through a public grievance system. The study applies the ‘Institutions of Sustainability’ framework to deconstruct institutions, characteristics of actors, properties of transactions, and governance in the action arena of responsive regulation so that their interactions can be analysed leading to the different outcomes in regulatory compliance. I base the empirical analysis on unique information sourced from the regulatory authorities on their enforcement activities between years 2005 and 2012. A mixed methods approach is applied which includes qualitative content analysis and quantitative statistical techniques. The results suggest that weak enforcement is not merely a corollary of poor regulatory financial capacities, but is endogenous to technical and human capital and to an important extent determined by particular political interventions aimed at reducing the severity of sanctions. I find that citizen participation plays an important role in making regulation responsive. This directs policy attention to strengthening of institutional mechanisms that help integrate private enforcement further. New insights on regulatory effectiveness can help addressing problems in other developing countries with similar institutional environments.